Australia’s advanced manufacturing capabilities could be affected by research security policies that restrict scientific collaboration with China, according to commentary published by the University of Technology Sydney’s Australia-China Relations Institute (UTS:ACRI).
In the article, Emeritus Professor Chris Cook discussed two UTS:ACRI reports examining how Australia’s research security requirements affect Chinese-background scientists working at Australian universities and their international research partnerships.
The reports, titled Right-Sizing Research Security: A Survey of Chinese-Background Scientists in Australian Universities and Right-Sizing Research Security in Practice: Interviews with Chinese-Background Scientists in Australian Universities, draw on a survey of 109 researchers and interviews with 12 senior scientists.
Cook said the findings raised concerns that uncertainty around research security requirements could undermine Australia’s scientific capabilities, including in fields important to advanced manufacturing and other emerging technologies.
The commentary identifies batteries, electric vehicles, rare earths processing, artificial intelligence and advanced manufacturing among the technology fields in which China has significant capabilities. Cook argued that research collaboration with China could provide Australian researchers with access to expertise, industrial partnerships and funding opportunities.
However, Cook acknowledged that international research collaboration can pose legitimate national security risks. He cited China’s proposed export controls on 40 technologies spanning artificial intelligence, biomedicine and solar energy as an example of countries treating technological capabilities as strategic assets.
The survey found that 62 per cent of respondents supported policies to manage security risks in international research, while 73 per cent favoured case-by-case assessments. However, 57 per cent said they had avoided, changed, delayed or ended China-related collaborations because of security policies, procedures or institutional expectations.
Cook noted that the survey was voluntary and self-selected, meaning its results could not be considered statistically representative of all Chinese-background researchers in Australia.
The reports recommend clearer guidance, more transparent review processes and assessments tailored to individual research projects. Cook said these measures would not weaken safeguards but make them more targeted and easier to navigate.
The commentary argued that Australia needs to balance the protection of sensitive research with maintaining international scientific partnerships, particularly in technology fields relevant to its future economic and manufacturing capabilities.
